

TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DEPT.

FILE BEGINS

FILE PERIOD: 1954-1956

PART

PART

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON COUNTER-SUBVERSION
IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES -
COMMUNISM IN AFRICA.

2
1919

ISD 127/145/01

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1987

INDEX HEADINGS

*Subversive
Activities*

Committee

Africa.

H.504

Group CO
Class 1035
Piece 126

CO1035/126

RELATED FILES -

- 13) 127/02 Official Committee on Southern Subversion in
Colonial Territories - agenda, Minutes.
13) 127/04 Official Committee on Southern Subversion in
Colonial Territories - Papers
LSD 61/01 Russia Influence in Africa

CROSS REFERENCED UNDER -

xR Communism

127/04

1 GEN. 520/3

13. 4. 56

CABINET DOCUMENT REMOVED AND DESTROYED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH CABINET OFFICE
INSTRUCTIONS: THE ORIGINAL SHOULD BE
FOUND IN THE CABINET OFFICE RECORDS.

Mr. Watson
Mr. Carstairs

Reference the proposal in the attached paper of Sir Norman Brook's Committee, GEN 520/3, about reports of Communism:

I think that the practice of the now defunct AC(0) Committee on Communism should not be followed. The Secretaries to that Committee extracted the portions from the Colonial Office Intelligence Summary relating to Communism, the draft was sent to me, I brought it as up to date as possible, and it was then circulated. I have always thought the practice dangerous because taking these excerpts out of their context and circulating them to a Committee, most of the members of which did not know the Colonies, must lead to a completely wrong appreciation of the state of affairs in that particular Colony. It has certainly led to our having to explain the most elementary facts about the Colonies which the AC(0) Committee thought were going to the Communist devil, and to little avail.

2. Again, in this paper we are told that there is evidence that the Communists are deploying a major offensive against "black" Africa. We have asked for that evidence, as we have none at all from the Colonies who are not blind to such matters. I am now working on a large amount of dialectical paper, mostly from the Foreign Office, with a view to telling Colonies that Communist interference in the Middle East and Egypt is bringing the danger nearer, etc. etc.

3. What "a despatch from the Foreign Office on Communism in Africa" precisely means, I do not know.

4. I now understand that the Colonial Attache in Washington has written saying that the US Consulate in Accra has reported to the effect that the Gold Coast authorities may invite representatives of the USSR to their Independence Day celebrations. I also understand that the Gold Coast Cabinet Committee, of which Botsio is Chairman, is considering to whom invitations should be issued for these celebrations. Various countries have been suggested as invitees but no decision had been taken by last month nor is likely for some time to come. It is reported that Botsio's present intention is that the USSR should be invited and there seems no doubt that this intention is shared by some of his colleagues. It is thought that by inviting the USSR Ministers will demonstrate their freedom of action, and that they do not wish to be behind Liberia in the universality of their invitations. It is not improbable, therefore, that invitations to Russia to attend the Independence Day celebrations will be issued in due course. (Unfortunately, ISD were not informed of this, although copies of the correspondence have been sent to the Foreign Office).

5. My suggestions are:-

- (a) we should remind Sir Norman Brook's Committee of the annual Survey of Communism which is done by Departments for the JIC, and say that we would expand such Colonial portions as his Committee may desire.
- (b) We should undertake to bring to the notice of Sir Norman Brook's Committee any material matter concerning Communism in any Colony at any time.

/I do

P20

WAF 506/742/01

Plec a Cont. culture
in 1957
Communism
in Africa.

I do hope that we will not agree to making regular, out of perspective, monthly reports as has been done in the case of the AC(O) Committee.

Max Barton

16 April 1956

Mr. Carstairs.

above

Please see Mr. Barton's note on GEN.520/3, with the general approach of which I entirely agree.

I hope you will agree to resist the suggestion made by Mr. Dean that this Committee should "succeed to" the reports of the kind which we used to make to the A.C.(O) Committee. As Mr. Barton says, these were summaries of current detailed intelligence relating to communism (and because they were not put in the context of the general situation in the territories concerned they were very apt to convey a misleading impression to the uninitiated).

In any event it does not seem to fit the functions of the present Committee for it to receive current detailed intelligence of this kind. Its job is to consider whether counter-subversion measures of a special kind are likely to be feasible and valuable in any individual territory. For this purpose, the Committee does not need detailed current intelligence: what it does need is to be kept broadly and accurately warned of the general state of affairs in any territories where the measures with which it is concerned may be useful. The Committee has asked for, and will be provided with at an early meeting, a general survey of the situation in the Colonial territories. This will of course have particular reference to Communism; and we can certainly undertake to keep the Committee informed of any major changes in the situation. It would, however, I think be sufficient at least at this stage in the Committee's working, if the Committee were to review the general situation as reported by us say every six months. That would leave the onus on us to bring to the Committee's notice any major changes in a particular territory which might occur in the meantime.

The second point raised by Mr. Dean is the old business of the "threat to Africa". We can tell the Committee quite bluntly that we propose as soon as possible to send a despatch to Colonial Governors warning them to keep their eyes skinned in view of recent developments. I think we should add however that, despite all the copious material that has been supplied to us by the Foreign Office we still think there is a tendency to overstate the threat, e.g. the wording in Mr. Dean's note that "the Communists are deploying a major offensive against black Africa". In these circumstances we are awaiting discussion of the Foreign Office papers in the J.I.C. before finalising our despatch.

It would be as well to enquire what exactly is the intention of the "despatch from the Foreign Office on Communism

V. 15061/01,
ad (155)-(156)
+ minutes on
DEF 109/61/02

4 /
in Africa" mentioned in Mr. Dean's note, and suggest that it would be as well if the Colonial Office could see it in draft if it has a bearing on the threat to our own territories.

(On this whole question it is very relevant that when last week the Prime Minister asked for evidence of Russian subversion in the United Kingdom or the Colonial territories, none was forthcoming from ourselves, the Foreign Office, or the Security Service).

The final point relates to a suggestion that the Gold Coast authorities may invite representatives of the U.S.S.R. to their Independence Day celebrations. It seems that some Gold Coast Ministers may have this in mind. If they are bent that way, I do not see how we could stop them on the eve of independence, although the Governor could no doubt try to use some persuasion. The danger is obvious, but it is hard to see how it might be met by any action coming within the scope of the present Committee.

W
17th April, 1956.

This item was not taken at yesterday's meeting. Await date of next meeting.

Wth

19/4 etc.

139
Mr. Cankin

You asked for the paper.

See my minute on WD 61/01.

WD
26/4

Sir T. Lloyd

I think you may be interested to see
(1) which is the letter from Mr. Dean circulated to Sir M. Brooks and Committee. Mr. Dean's?

not

last copy, his letter to us in the first place. The
paper was not taken at the last meeting
of the Ctee, for lack of time. It will be
taken at the next meeting on 4/5/56;
and I think that it would be well to
get our views on record, in writing, as in drafts.

As to the point about the "new
Communist strategy" & the "major
offensive against 'Black' Africa", please
see on ISD 61/01 below.

Apr 27/4

Apr passed. See also minute on ISD 61/01.

1. (1) (6) 27.4

Bm (for broad Ctee) on 2/5, with ISD 9/07

M. Watson
M. Barton
to see.

Apr 28/4

along

2 Sir M. Brook - Ref 615

28.4.56

4 Short-Jewell - 51023/64 - 9.5.56

Mr. Watson
Mr. Carstairs

Reference attached which apparently is to be returned within a fortnight in a box to the Foreign Office:

Is it impossible for the Foreign Office to be asked to circulate the drafts of any despatches which they may wish to send to their posts which deal with Colonial affairs?

2. We have suffered a lot lately from the over-emphasis which the Foreign Office has placed on what they then called a "Russian drive" on "black" Africa, and I think it very wrong for them to have said, see para. 7, that the Colonial Service is myopic where Communism is concerned. Indeed, the Service has had much experience, during the last 5 years at any rate.

3. Mr. Bourn tells me that the French have now put Communism on the agenda for the discussions which are to be held with their Colonial Office in the near future. I have already drawn attention to the assessment of French security which, in one line, is that their Service Ministries are getting better, but that their Civil Ministries are really insecure. Since that assessment was made the French elections have resulted in an increased number of Communists in the Chamber.

Max Baile

10 May 1956

5 Extract from CEM 520/3 mtg held - 16.5.56

CABINET DOCUMENT REMOVED AND DESTROYED
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3 GEN. 520/5 — Ref (15) — 2-5-56

(3) will present to the Cabinet Office

on 16/5.

INSTRUCTIONS: THE ORIGINAL SHOULD BE

FOUND IN THE CABINET OFFICE RECORDS.

~~A.O. 15/5 with 1SD 6/01~~

and DEF 109/01

HW 4/5 at ease

Mr. Barker
Mr. Watson

To see (5) Action is required on
conclusion 2 + 3.

On conclusion 2, it will I think
be necessary to add Sir N. Booth to
the distribution of the monthly summary.
The other members of the Ctee
already get it, but Major General Stirling
said he wd like to have a copy
personally. Perhaps a copy of conclusion 2
shd be put on Mr. Barker's paper about
the summary for necessary action.

On conclusion 3 that seems to be
required now is to send to HQ.
the letter already drafted designed to
extract some further elucidation of point
in (4). The draft is at the moment loose
behind (5).

do not
agree with
"personally".
I will have
to go with
Mr. Barker
on this
question

JB 24/5

Early

W. H. G.

23/5/56.

H504 (Mr. Barker)

(i) A-A of (5) shd. be extracted both
to the file in which the 'general review' is
being prepared, & to that about circulation
of the C.O. Intelligence Summary

(ii) B-B to be extracted to ISD 61/01.

2 (i) to Mr. Barker for action. (ii) to myself,
with this file & bundle attached.

H. K. 31
Pre make 2
extracts of
A-A of 5 and
one extract
B-B.

W. H. G.
H504
25/5

C.D.
R. 25 MAY 56
D. 26 - R

W. H. G.
24/5

6 Cabinet Office - GEN. 520/13 - 21.6.56

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INSTRUCTIONS: THE ORIGINAL SHOULD BE

FOUND IN THE CABINET OFFICE RECORDS.

7 To Dean (70) - ^{TS} (off on 15D 61/01).

Sir T. Lloyd

I think that you should see (b), which will be considered by the Committee on 6th July.

The statement at x/ in para. 3 begs precisely the question which we have for months been asking the F.O., without reply, and before I saw (b) I had prepared the draft - which has now issued on 15D 61/01 - copy at (7) hereon. I

mentions this last night to the S/S who welcomed them in the letter and asked to be kept informed of developments.

The C.O. were not understood consulted about the statement, which I am told is contained in a paper P.R.(Sb)3, circulated to Ministers a day or two ago, which we have not yet seen (it is with the S. 1/6).

X/ As to action on (b), I am trying to find out how much of (a) to (d) in para 3 the Committee will be expected to tackle, as our representative at the meeting, apart from myself, will depend on that. The recommendation itself is not precise.

I do not think that the question of evidence or otherwise for these statements about Communist plans is academic. In one thing the efficacy of our countermeasures depends largely

X It is of practical importance in another way also - i.e. we should be able to formulate the evidence in a way which the General, Col. Galt (or Nicholson) had the point in mind.

largely on the correctness of the diagnosis. and, conversely, an over-attribution of our trouble to Communism, or any other influence, is bound to lead to mistakes of policy which could in themselves be as damaging as the influences in question.

W. Cairns

23/6/56

Action on this
will be pursued
on 15/6/56.

WJ

See. The "evidence" is accumulating (esp. in the
minutes of 2 of the exco. (to be)) but for a variety of
reasons it will be well to have it set out explicitly

J. (7) Gra
25/6

Sir H. Poynter

Pl. see (b) and minutes. Especially XI
overleaf. I have now learnt from
Sir N. Brook's secretary that the intention is
that the Ctee should have a very preliminary
canter over the whole of (a) to (d) in para 3 of (b),
with the object of identifying aspects, preferably
involving punitive action, for more detailed
study, & that Sir N. Brook does not propose to
ask "specialists" in these aspects to attend other
than those already members of his Ctee.

I should however like to have a word

with

Done
GJ

with you about this, since most if not all of
the points in (a) to (d) which are not within
my purview are within yours.

AJ C. Lewis
25/6/56

Mr Salzworth

Mr Thomas

I spoke of on briefly about para. 3 of (b)
which will be taken by Sir N. Brooks Cbe, in
a preliminary way, on 6/7/56.

As regards (a) in that para, I should be grateful
if Mr Salzworth would let me know the upshot of
current discussions with the T. & G. also

As regards (b), I understand the line is
that we hope we have succeeded in making
an argument which will prevent a stampede
of expatriates from Nigeria: that the "pool"
scheme may help regarding certain key
personnel but is not designed to cover the
general run: that for the rest we have to
look to the ordinary machinery of recruitment
bearing in mind that in some fields there is
an absolute shortage of suitably qualified
candidates.

AJ C. Lewis
27/6/56

8 Note by Mr. Galsworthy

Mr. Carstairs,

9

After discussion with Mr. Galsworthy
I have placed opposite a note which may help you to
deal with the economic assistance point in para 3 of
(6).

(W.G. Wilson)

29/6

On (b). The special list proposals have been
welcomed in principle by the Govts of the
North & West Regions of Nigeria but the other
two Govts will not consider them until next
month.

The initial reactions of senior officials have
not been very favourable and if they are to
be induced to stay on it may be necessary
to amend the proposals in some respects.

The matter is to be discussed with Sir
James Robinson next week and it may then
be possible to add something to the above.

W.G. Wilson 30/6

Mr. Galsworthy

Mr. Carstairs.

(6) is to be discussed in a very preliminary way
at Sir N. Brooke's Ctee on 6/7 - I understand the
purpose is to define more clearly which aspects
of the matters set out in para. 3 are
appropriate for further study by that Ctee.

I should be v. grateful for any comments which
you would like me to bear in mind, or put
forward, at this stage.

G. Carstairs

27/56

Mr. Carstairs

I have put a separate minute at (10) opposite.

hub2nd July, 1956.

P.S. I agree with what Sir H.
Poynter says about race relations and
trade unions

hub

The very interesting minutes already written
cover most of the points but I attach a note of one or
two further points *from the W. African angle.*

as seenS.

3. 7. 1956.

Harris' minute.

W. H. G.
10/7

12. Extract from *REV 539/5* - *Mtg held 9.7.56*

Mr. Watson

Mr. Carstairs

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(12) is the record of the inter-church

discussion at the Booth Committee of the
Chairman's paper at (6). The only action it
calls for is indicated in conclusion (2), - an
extract of that conclusion might be put in
ISD 61/01.

The tree will presumably return to
this paper later, though I do not know
how or when. I wonder whether it would

be helpful if the Co. were to put in
a memorandum commenting on the
Chairman's paper — using the notes at 8, 9,
10 & 11 in this file — in an attempt to
get the discussion on to useful lines.
One objection to this course is that we
should thereby implicitly invite the Cbe
to discuss matters outside its proper scope,
but ~~the other~~ the Chairman's paper has
itself already brought about this result.
So far as I know the Co. have not
yet been invited to give their views
to the Policy Review Committee direct; the Brook
Committee have, & we might therefore be
able to use the Brook Committee as a
channel to bring to the attention of the P.A. Cbe
the important points made in 8, 9, 10 & 11.

Mr. Gerald Barnes, Mr. Lockwood &
Sir H. Poynton may like to see (12) —
unless it is thought unnecessary to trouble
them again until something more definite
emerges from the Brook Cbe.

12/7/52.

Ph Cantan's

I am rather doubtful about
reopening discussion of this I putting in
a C.O. paper, as suggested by Ph Cox:
But you will be able to judge better in the
light of the discussion at the meeting.

State it for (12) that the
intention is, as we have reported
a conclusion (2), that the Cbe should
then present a considered report on (6)

to the Policy Review Committee. There will no doubt
have to be further discussion in the Committee for that
to be done & no doubt we shall have a cut
at the report - draft. I should have thought
we cd. make sure of working in our parts
at that stage.


X If you agree, all that is immediately
necessary is to pick this up with the
"Africa" papers, & extracts incl. 2
to ISD 61/81, to make sure that we
report to the Committee as soon as that exercise
is concluded.

WV
18/7

Pages: as at X/.

6/19/7 along

H.431 R
Pse make
extracts of para 2
of 125 - at "X"



Mr. Butler, you may care to see generally.
B.W. Fisher 25/2/56.

See H.2m
JB 25/7

AD

13 Extract from General Staff Meeting held 10/9/56
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INSTRUCTIONS: THE ORIGINAL SHOULD BE
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15/10/56
16/10

CLOSED

NO FURTHER
ACTION

TO BE TAKEN
IN THIS FILE.

CONTINUED ON:-

159 (27/105/01- 57-59)

11

N O T E

(a) Assistance in
~~to be considered~~ an economic development.

I would only add to what Sir Hilton Poynton, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Gorell Barnes have said that in the case of basic development of Government Services - communications etc., - it is not only a question of money but of money plus men. The question therefore ties up with (b). The appalling shortage of engineers for instance holds up much development in West Africa.

There has of course always been a good deal of foreign investment in West Africa - e.g. The Swiss Union Trading Company and the French C.F.A.O, plus a number of Syrian or Lebanese and Greek firms. Since the war Italian contractors have done useful work, e.g. in building roads, and an elaborate survey of the potentialities of the Niger River is now being done by the Dutch Company Nedeco. There is nothing sinister in any of these. Nigerian Governments have continually flirted with the idea of attracting foreign enterprises and foreign technicians. Two Ministers from the Eastern Region were due to visit Italy, Switzerland and Germany this month to try and collect engineers and others but the visit has just been put off, no doubt owing to their preoccupation with a local political crisis.

^{financially}
The Volta Dam may of course in a year or two become as much of a test case as the High Dam in Egypt.

(b) The supply of competent "administrators and technicians".

The Special List proposals will as at present proposed only apply, when they have been accepted by the Governments, to existing staff in Nigeria who opt to join the Special List. We are now considering whether we cannot make them apply to new recruitment but it is a difficult problem because we cannot guarantee a permanent career to all the men necessary for the next few years.

The Gold Coast are being fairly successful in recruiting British staff for themselves but experienced career administrators will get thinner and thinner on the ground.

For Sierra Leone and the Gambia the recruitment problems are the same as for the rest of the Colonial Empire.

(c) Education.

There is, as far as I know, little evidence of communism or near-communism being taught in the schools. There are unfortunately one or two communist-minded staff in the University colleges. Mr. Carstairs will know the position about this.

As in East Africa we are concerned at Egyptian influence the possibilities of which, I fear, are ^{the} stronger because of the much larger number of West Africans who are Muslims (16 or 17 millions in Nigeria, 1 million Sierra Leone, nearly the whole (small) population of the Gambia). We have it in mind to expand the School of Arabic Studies at Kano and to arrange increased facilities for Arabic and Islamic studies at Fourah Bay in Sierra Leone.

Some of the Muslims, particularly in the North of Nigeria, are very devout. However much they may like individual Englishmen,

/basically

basically they regard them as infidels. There is a constant possibility of a Muslim revival which might become anti-British.

(d) Police and Intelligence.

There is room for considerable improvement in police and intelligence arrangements in Sierra Leone. Improvements are now in hand. Also in Nigeria there is the problem of intelligence in a semi-self-governing country. As to the police, we may have difficulty in resisting demands to regionalise them which would considerably weaken their effectiveness and render them liable to political influence. We ~~shall~~ take a very strong line over this.

(2) ← Racial discrimination is a much less serious problem than in East and Central Africa. Socially there is none. Economically it is true that the big mining concerns - Sierra Leone and Gold Coast Selection Trusts, Gold Coast Gold Mines, tin mines in Nigeria - are owned and run by British capitalists while the labouring classes are Africans but on the whole employer and employee relationships are not too bad (despite General Spears).

(f) Trade Unions.

There has been some communist influence in one of the trade unions in the Gold Coast but it is not at present serious.

(g) ← Closer administration might well be useful in Sierra Leone and Northern Nigeria but the time for it has, alas, passed in the Gold Coast and the East and West of Nigeria.

(h) Firmness.

I quite agree with Mr. Gorell Barnes. I would add that firmness in maintaining moral standards over such matters as bribery and corruption and wrongful exercise of political influence by Ministers is to my mind also very important.

(i) In West Africa we are extremely lucky in that all three Regional Governments in Nigeria and both the main parties in the Gold Coast have come out with anti-communist statements. I would not put it past some of them to change their minds but for the present all is well.

(j) This is in marked contradistinction to the French. British territories in West Africa are interlocked with the French. There is of course a very strong communist influence in the French Union. Perhaps because the French have been slow in devolving power to them, French officials were lamenting to us the other day that there was a tendency for their national movements to identify themselves with the communists. Their trade unions in French West Africa are also integrated with the trade unions in France; for instance, hotel workers at Dakar came out on strike this spring in sympathy with their fellow hotel workers in Marseilles. There is for the most part remarkably little contact between British and French African politicians but it is bound to increase, not least because the French African politicians hope that they can learn from what is happening in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. This is a possible source from which communist ideas may infiltrate into British territory.

3/7

Top Secret

Mr. Carstairs.

~~So far as I am aware I believe that,~~ Although we have knowledge that the Soviet planners are beginning to pay more attention to Africa generally, I do not believe that we have any evidence of any direct attempt having so far been made by the Soviet bloc to encourage subversion in East or Central Africa. We have, however, ample and daily evidence of such attempts by Egypt so far as concerns Somaliland (and of course Somalia), the three East African mainland territories, Zanzibar and Aden (which must, I think, not be left out of account in this connection). How far the Soviet bloc are directly behind these attempts we cannot tell. That the Egyptians are encouraged to make them more boldly by actual and potential support from the Soviet bloc there is no doubt.

As regards means of defeating subversion, I would list higher than any of the items mentioned in paragraph 58 "firmness of policy". By that I mean firmness of policy both vis-à-vis those from without who are encouraging subversion, and ~~firmness of policy~~ against those who are attempting subversion within or seeking to browbeat us into surrendering power faster than is in our own interests or those of the inhabitants of the territories concerned. If, so long as the Egyptians continue their present anti-British policies, we indulge in appeasement towards them or give the territories for which we are responsible any reason to feel that it pays to be hostile to us rather than friendly, then we may expect subversive activities to grow in our territories. Equally, if we continually, after making declarations of policy, are persuaded by political pressure or threats from vocal minorities to abandon them and go ever ~~has been~~ further and faster in giving concessions (as ~~is~~ apt to be the case recently in Uganda), then, again, we cannot expect anything but an increase of subversive activities which will increasingly be joined by people who would not otherwise be subversive, simply because they feel that they must climb on the bandwagon before we get out altogether. This matter of internal policies is, of course, for us; but the question of our attitude towards countries encouraging subversive activities in our territories seems to me to be one which it would be very much worth your while ventilating in the sub-committee.

I find the comment in (6) on "Assistance in economic development" profoundly depressing. In their minutes Sir H. Poynton and Mr. Wilson have shown that the necessary assistance is unlikely to be forthcoming from other quarters. To this I would add that, if it were forthcoming from other quarters, then our influence in the territories would pass to those who were supplying the assistance; and, if the assistance were being supplied by the Americans, then I suggest that the influence which they obtained either would be directed towards encouraging subversive activities against our authority or would be used with better objects, but so clumsily as to encourage rather than discourage our enemies - probably both at the same time. I

am

am all for taking a reasonable amount of American assistance - that is to say more than anything which has been offered so far. But I would be entirely against looking to the Americans to supplant us as the main suppliers of finance for East and Central Africa. If we are to remain an Imperial Power, we really must be prepared to provide the financial as well as the other sinews of Empire.

I would add, however, that I am not sure that the finance which we do provide could not be better directed. That too little of the finance available for the Colonial Empire as a whole goes to Africa is an opinion which I would be expected to hold and which you will no doubt discount to the degree you consider appropriate. For the rest, I suspect that we get much better value out of finance which is more or less placed at the free disposal of the Government concerned, or at any rate is used to support their own budget - as, for instance, in the case of Emergency assistance to Kenya - than we do from much of our C.D. & W. expenditure. Some big schemes are no doubt justified and heavy expenditure on communications is essential. But I believe it is closer administration which can contribute more than anything else both to increased living standards for Africans and to the early diagnosis and proper control of subversive activities. Closer administration has certainly been the key to the restoration of the Reserves to a state in which they can begin safely to re-absorb detainees both from the political and from the economic point of view. It may be too late in Uganda for closer administration to be politically possible - for reasons which I am sure you will understand I would not like to state an opinion on that for another 7 or 8 months; but in Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland I believe that immense things could be done if we could get more people - particularly more administrative officers-on to the ground. That requires both the chaps and ordinary straightforward budgetary provision; the Kenya experience shows that, if the latter is available, the former will probably follow, even though it may be at the cost of taking some risks on standards.

What I have said above covers, I think, (a) and (b) in paragraph 3 of (6). I do not think I have anything particular to say about (c). On (d) I would add to what is said in the paper itself that we have seen time and again that the problem is always to find a way of taking, before a state of real emergency arises, that small amount of arbitrary action which would prevent the emergency from arising at all. When I visited Kenya in the early stages of the Mau Mau Emergency, I remember so well one of the loyal Chiefs explaining to me how all those terrible things would never have happened if we had dealt firmly at an early stage with a small number of agitators. Sir G. Colby said the same to me about the riots in Nyasaland; and at this moment we are trying to cope with very much the same sort of problem in the Aden Protectorate. I am afraid I can suggest no solution to this problem. When I came back from my first visit to East and Central Africa

This I fear, is
not feasible
S.C. or S.W.
Nigeria. It
is politically
too late
in Kenya

Africa after taking over the African Division, I set on foot an enquiry into this very problem. It produced some small results in the shape of one or two alterations in the Penal Code tightening up the definition of sedition in one or two territories; but, broadly speaking, I became convinced that we had to choose between abandoning the rule of British law in our territories or letting things develop to a point where an emergency situation was inevitable. If anybody else can solve this problem, I think they will have gone a long way towards dealing, so far as Africa is concerned, with the subject matter of the paper at (6).

WMB

2nd July, 1956.

GEN. 520/13: Note on paragraph 3: Assistance in economic development in Africa.

The prime need of the African Colonies, particularly those in East Africa, is for loan funds for basic development of economic services such as communications, power and agriculture and social services such as education and housing and water supplies. If these services are provided private capital will follow with the emergence of a literate and healthy labour force and economies which are equipped with adequate railways, roads and power supplies. But they can only be provided if the supply of long term loan funds from overseas is adequate.

There is not the slightest hope that foreign capital will be attracted to projects of this kind except to a very marginal extent. Out of ~~£6000~~ £600 m. invested in the Colonies from overseas since 1949, about £25m came from the United States. £10m or so of this went to the Copper mines of Rhodesia, and £7m to the bauxite industry in Jamaica. Despite the propaganda about American Government investment, the total invested under the various programmes in the Colonies has been less than £5m in the last six years. Not a penny of private American capital has gone into basic Colonial development projects of the kind listed above. The same is true of other foreign investment. Some few Swiss, Dutch, French and German firms have put money into their own lines of business in Africa, but in very small amounts. None has gone into basic development. In the past month the Swiss banks have made it clear that even with a British Government guarantee of repayment and exchange they would not lend more than £2m for railways in East Africa. We have made every feasible effort to attract foreign capital to basic development in Africa, and we shall continue to do so, but the results have been, and will continue to be, insignificant in their impact on basic development needs.

The only useful source of foreign investment has been the International Bank. We are on close and friendly terms with the Bank, which has so far provided or promised some £40m. for basic rail and power development in East and Central Africa. In the next two or three years we hope to raise a further £10m at least from the Bank, half of it for Nigerian Railways.

But the main source of loan funds for basic development must continue to be the United Kingdom. We delude ourselves if we think that any other source can even begin to take its place. If we are to ~~prevent~~ prevent an actual slowing down of development in the Colonies we need an average of £25 to £30 m. in loan money from the London market each year. In 1955 we were able to raise £9m and this year we shall raise £12m. The situation is very critical indeed, and the Committee must be disabused of the belief that it can be remedied by foreign investors.

To meet the situation we have put a series of proposals to the Treasury, some of them designed to carry us through the difficulties in the short term, and some of them addressed to the long term need to step up the flow of loan funds to the Colonies, especially the African Colonies. These proposals are still under discussion, but their acceptability turns ultimately on a single factor, namely whether the UK is able and prepared to divert loan funds to the Colonies from within the resources available to it. The question is not whether, since our 'capacity is limited', we can turn to other sources of finance. They cannot fill the need. The question is whether our stake in Africa is important enough to us to make us decide to rearrange the use to which we put our available capacity, both in the UK itself and overseas, so that a bigger share is deliberately switched to the Colonies.

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8

TOP SECRET

Mr. Carstairs

I have been giving some further thought to the document which we discussed yesterday afternoon. I had not originally intended to put anything on paper but one or two new points have occurred to me since, and I am therefore sending you these notes which I think may be of some use.

Dealing first with the short passage in the Report which refers to the grave potential danger in Africa - I forget the exact words - I am not quite sure whether the authors mean that there is a great risk in the sense of a great probability of something happening, or whether they mean a great risk in the sense that the consequences would be serious. The two things are by no means necessarily the same. The probability of my leaving an umbrella in the train is very high: the consequences are negligible. The probability of an atom bomb exploding by mistake at wherever these things are made is perhaps negligible: the consequences would be disastrous. So far, So, as you pointed out, we are in the dark because the evidence has been consistently withheld from us. I assume that the evidence does exist and that we have not really been treated to an overdose of imagination. If the evidence is still withheld from us I do not see how the Secretary of State can properly discharge his responsibility to Parliament, and we might in the last resort have to make a Ministerial issue out of this. I should guess that the appreciation was overdrawn, but I agree that, for the purpose of your first meeting and in the absence of the evidence, you must assume as a working hypothesis that the appreciation is correct without committing the Colonial Office to accepting it as such in fact.

We then come on to the four courses of action suggested in the paper. The first of these is the need for more economic assistance, with a strong hint in a later passage that we could not expect any more finance for economic development from the United Kingdom and would have to rely increasingly on foreign capital. As regards finance for Colonial development, you agreed to have a word with Mr. Galsworthy shortly before your meeting and find out the latest form from him. Whether economic or social development (and the two must go together) is really an effective answer to Communism is a very debatable point. My own views were given in the Lecture which I gave at Oxford in April, and which you heard. But, for the purpose of your meeting, I would not be sceptical, for if we can use this argument to bring pressure for more assistance for Colonial development, by all means let us do so. The only point to guard against is that it should become a point of policy that finance for Colonial development must be justified only to the extent that it is regarded as a weapon against Communist penetration.

The next point was the need for administrative and technical officers. You agreed to have a word with Mr. Thomas about the effect of the latest H.M.O.C.S. White Paper and also to find out from him whether this scheme would help with the problem of

/new

new recruitment, or whether some other proposals were under consideration for that purpose. I would only make two points of my own. The first is that "administrators and technicians" is much too restricted. There is great need for many professional and scientific people who would certainly not thank you for calling them "technicians". The second point is that, however much we may work out schemes such as the latest H.M.O.C.S. White Paper to provide inducements for serving officers to remain in their Colonies, it still rests with the Colonial Government to decide whether they want to use one of these expatriate officers, for they will certainly wish to fill any post which they can by a local candidate. Even if the Secretary of State had powers to require them to take an expatriate officer in particular cases, such an officer imposed on a Colony against the will of the local Government could not possibly do his job.

The Report seems to be considering this particular point solely in terms of Government Service. I think it needs to be considered on a wider basis, namely whether Colonial Governments in Africa will be willing to go on engaging the services of British or other reputable experts outside direct Government Service - e.g. Consulting Engineers, Building Contractors, and so on. So long as Colonial Governments continue to use the services of the Crown Agents this will probably look after itself, and the experience of the Gold Coast in its flirtations with the Dutch firm of Schockbeton was in the long run encouraging. As you know, they burnt their fingers badly, and pretty nearly every important Gold Coast contract since then has been placed, of their own volition, with British firms. But this in turn raises two points, neither of which is within the control of the Colonial Office. In the first place, the fiscal policy of the United Kingdom must provide reasonable incentives for firms to work abroad. Secondly, the firms themselves must not be unduly complacent about the Colonial market. They will only retain it by quality, comparable price, and delivery dates which are adhered to. This again throws us back into domestic policies at home, for very often the firms themselves are "humbled" by industrial disputes, or sometimes internal trade union disputes such as the famous Cammel Laird hole-boring argument. It is worth reminding your Committee, however, that in another forum (the Economic Steering Committee) a great deal of attention is being devoted to the importance of keeping the Russians out of important contracts in vulnerable territories - precisely because this might lead to the infiltration of Soviet technicians and others, and thus to political indoctrination. It is not enough to think of this solely in terms of recruitment into the Colonial Service.

The third point was a plea for more education on the right lines, coupled with some remarks about propaganda. I leave the propaganda to you. So far as the educational side is concerned, it may be necessary to remind your Committee that men and women must be free to choose their careers. It

/would

trend of
education

would be a strange way of combating Communism to direct A to become a Dentist, B to become a Clergyman and C to become a clerk in the Secretariat. The most that Government can do is to try and influence the ~~trained people~~ by incentives such as scholarships and, to some extent, by providing the right facilities. But there is a limit to what can be done in this direction. If there is in some territory a strong demand for better opportunities for training in Medicine, it will be politically impossible for the local Government to refuse to provide those facilities but to build an agricultural research college instead. So far as the University Colleges and Technical Colleges are concerned, it must be borne in mind that they are academically autonomous bodies. They are not Government institutions and, insofar as they receive any advice on academic questions, they receive it from the I.U.C. or A.C.C.C.A.S.T. No doubt some of the self-styled realists will deploy the usual argument that we ought not to be training so many people as Doctors and Lawyers, and that what is wanted is vocational training. I think I have answered this question already, but it might be worthwhile getting from Mr. Keith some indication of the trend in the courses which Colonial students take up in this country. The rise in the numbers of people taking engineering, for example, is, I believe, very striking. No doubt somebody will also come up with the hardy annual about bringing students over to this country, where they become indoctrinated by Communism. You probably know all the answers to that one at least as well as I do.

The fourth course of action proposed related to police intelligence and security services, which I leave entirely to you.

There are, however, two points which the paper doesn't mention at all and which I should have thought had a very direct bearing on this problem. The first is "race relations" generally, and by that I don't mean so much the accession to international conventions about human rights, but the ordinary behaviour of people both in the Colonies and this country. This ties up with "Overseas Service". This is particularly relevant in the context of the pressure which is being exerted upon us by the C.R.O. and the Foreign Office for closer political liaison with the Union of South Africa about the future of tropical Africa. Anything more calculated to drive tropical Africa into Communism than a suspicion that we were reorientating our policy on race relations in order to appease the Union of South Africa it is difficult to imagine.

The other point is "industrial relations". Where, as so often, the employers are White and the employees are Black, it is obvious that an industrial dispute, if clumsily handled, can very easily turn into a racial dispute leading in some cases to riots. Moreover, because in most cases the big commercial enterprises are controlled from outside the Colony - mostly in the United Kingdom or the United States - an industrial dispute can very easily lead also into a political controversy about "Colonial exploitation":

/Too

"Too big a share of the profits is being taken out of the country by European capitalists and not enough left for the workers or the local Government." Seeing that racial discrimination and Colonial exploitation are probably the two aspects of the Communist propaganda which most readily appeal to Colonial peoples, it is curious that a Report of this kind should fail to mention either point at all. But that is what is apt to happen when people try to write reports about Colonial affairs without bringing in the Colonial Office.

If you raise this point, as I hope you will, you will probably get another old chestnut served up to you, namely the folly of developing trade unions in the Colonies which are just hot-beds of Communism. The short answer to this is: "They aren't" - except, I suppose, in Hong Kong and Singapore. A fuller answer is that once you have any system of wage-earning employment you automatically get an employer/worker relationship, and therefore there must be machinery for negotiation between the two. Trade unionism would seem to be the best system that has so far been evolved, and the T.U.C. here, whatever other criticisms one may wish to make of them, are certainly not pro-communist. Just in case one of the more assiduous members of your Committee may have read the Report of the Royal Commission on East Africa, I should perhaps remind you that they have something to say about trade union development which has been taken out of its context by many people and completely misinterpreted. On page 161 of their Report at the end of paragraph 37 the Commission say that the "attempt to encourage the growth of trade unions on the British model is likely, for some time to come, to represent an expenditure of effort which might be employed more effectively in other directions". This has been taken in certain quarters as a condemnation by the Royal Commission of our policy of developing trade unions, but the Commission themselves have been at some pains to explain at the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee and elsewhere that this was not their intention at all. The operative words are: "on the British model". I don't imagine you will get into this kind of detail, but it may be just as well to be forewarned.

Andersson

27th June, 1956.

Draft
ISD 61/01

23rd June, 1956.

7

TOP SECRET

As I told you, we have been struggling with the problem of how to present to the Colonial Governments concerned the problem constituted by the apparent new, or impending, "drive" by Soviet Russia and/or the Soviet bloc toward "Black Africa" in particular, and we have been finding it pretty heavy going. I have myself been trying my hand at a draft, with the intention of circulating it for comment and advice, but I have come to the conclusion that the process might be materially simplified, and the product much improved, if we were to have an antecedent discussion of the problems involved, and clarify a number of points which to us at any rate still appear to be obscure. My object in writing is to ask if the Foreign Office, and MI5 and MI6, to whom I am sending copies of this letter, would be good enough to depute representatives to attend a meeting here for this purpose.

We should I think in the first place have regard to past appreciations including particularly what has been said to Colonial Governments, in order that we may know what we have to build on and/or to amplify or modify. In particular, we should have in mind our circular despatch 498/53 of the 30th of May, 1953, headed "The Kremlin and the "Colonial Revolution"", which was framed in consultation with the old A.C.(O) Committee and circulated to them in A.C.(O)(53)30 of the 9th of July 1953. Subsequent relevant documents are the Survey of Communist Policy toward the Colonies, also prepared for the A.C.(O) Committee, which was circulated to the J.I.C. under J.I.C./1510/55 of the 1st of June, 1955. Passages in J.I.C.(56)10(Final) of the 20th of April, 1956, being the J.I.C. survey of World Communism in 1955, are also relevant, notably the forecast for 1956 contained in paragraphs 16 to 19 of the covering summary. In addition, of course, the subject is a recurrent theme in the flow of Intels including particularly the Monthly Review of Trends of Propaganda etc., which go to Colonial Governors, and it

/figures

P.H. DEAN, ESQ., C.M.G.

figures regularly in the special series of "Yellow Memoranda" which we prepare in consultation with other Departments for the indoctrination of Colonial Ministers and members of Executive Councils. The first thing which we should like to do would be to look over this kind of material, and consider whether, so far as it goes, what was said then was substantially accurate or requires now to be modified.

Given that, the next thing to do is I think to identify and assess the various indicators of a new policy, or method, in order that we may advise Colonial Governors in as clear terms as possible of what seems to us to be impending, and what they should look out and prepare for. This is the part of the exercise which has caused us most difficulty, and on which we feel most in need of help from other Departments. So far as I have been able to study the voluminous papers, the headings appear to be fairly clear, and for convenience I set them out in summary form in the enclosed note. What we should like to be helped on is whether these headings are correct, and in particular what assessment one is to place on the significance of each, and of the whole lot taken together.

If you, and Hollis and Easton agree, could you let me know who would attend the meeting which I have suggested, and I shall then arrange it.

In view of the interest of the Committee on Counter-Subversion in Colonial Territories, I am sending a copy also to Brook.

(C.Y. Carstairs.)

P.S. Since drafting the above, I have seen GEN.520/13 of the 21st of June, in paragraph 3 of which are quoted certain paragraphs touching Africa taken from a wider survey by officials. The evidence for the statement in paragraph 57 of the extract quoted that "we know that the Communist bloc have plans for subversion throughout the Continent" would I think go far to solve our problem.

LIST OF POINTERS TO NEW SOVIET STRATEGY
IN RESPECT OF "BLACK AFRICA."

1. "Competitive co-existence" with special reference to the economic drive.
2. The achievement of footholds in the Middle East, Egypt and adjacent areas.
3. Attempted infiltration into West Africa particularly via Liberia.
4. Re-statement of policy at the 20th Party Congress in February, 1956.
5. Evidence of basic studies of African affairs, including economics, sociology and linguistic studies.



**CABINET OFFICE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET
S.W.1.**

WHITEHALL 5422

*H-104 Pl note
+ reg the despatch
on 150-pp. 6/1/01*

It is not necessary for the
Foreign Office Despatch on Communism
and Africa, which was circulated to
you on 9th May, to be returned to the
Foreign Office as requested in the
slip attached to the Despatch.
Receipt forms should, however, be
returned to the Foreign Office.

(Signed) J.B. Hunt

14th May, 1956.



1 agenda for
The Cantains + are for file.



WHITEHALL 5422

CABINET OFFICE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1.

Penell

SECRET

COMMITTEE ON COUNTER-SUBVERSION
IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES

The Chairman has asked that the enclosed
despatch should be circulated to all members of the
Committee for their information.

*Copy ✓ E/37
on 15D 61/01*

(Signed) J.B. HUNT

Secretary.

9th May, 1956

H. 504



*Pl. enc in box
for Mr. Barton. Mr. Watkin
& Mr. Caskins to see,
& then return to
F.O. as directed on
attached slip.
See new note of 14/5*

*Wtly
w/s*

SECRET

Foreign Office (Secret) and Whitehall (Secret) Distribution

J 1023/6 G

Copy No. 108

COMMUNISM AND AFRICA

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (Paris)

(No. 307. Secret)
Sir,

Foreign Office,
April 21, 1956.

1. Copies of this document must not be made.

2. The document itself should be returned within a fortnight, in a box (but NOT a telegram box), to Room 118, Foreign Office. Failure to return these documents will result in suspension of their supply.

concerned about the mounting evidence that the machinery of Communism, has recently been more active than before to African affairs.

It has now been active in the field of international relations. It is possible to look back and see fairly clearly how it is preparing for an offensive against a specific area. Her Majesty's Government and other friendly academic research in leading universities reinforced prominent ex-Communists all establish a definite difference between the areas concerned, is the Foreign Office the various departments which deal with affairs from different angles have all observed and are building up with regard to Africa and particularly

the East Indies and Malaya are well on the way to the end of the real colonial world left outside Africa, but colonialism African illustrations are used more and more. The striking increase in Soviet propaganda "against the East" is a phenomenon which has virtually disappeared except in the case of Communist intentions. The increase in this

propaganda is one of the classic trends of evidence for any major subversive undertaking. In this context I am not merely thinking of the statements made by Khrushchev at the last Party Congress that it was now part of Soviet foreign policy to see the last vestiges of the colonial system eliminated (though the significance of this statement should not be overlooked).

4. A more serious cause for concern is the increased interest in colonial and African affairs which is being shown by all the International Front organisations operated by the Communists. For instance, the World Federation of Trade Unions, perhaps the most authoritative of these organisations, published in its monthly instructions for January a major article entitled "Independence for the Colonial Peoples—a Common Demand of the Workers of the World." This is no academic essay: cast in the form of an account of current events (which bears scarcely any resemblance to the facts as both we and the organisers of the Federation know them), it is in fact a set of instructions both for propaganda and for action. An analysis of the article translated into plain English is enclosed. Similarly, as you may have seen, the International Union of Students is organising a special seminar this month in Prague on problems of colonialism. Such seminars have never been objective and academic studies of problems but are training grounds for subversive action.

5. Behind these operations, and reinforcing them, is the increased academic research now being devoted to African problems. All Communist, and especially Russian, writing makes it clear that this should not be conducted in the abstract but should be harnessed to the specific interests of the State. The Soviet Union has for many years found it very difficult to provide the trained academic manpower which it requires for research even into matters which are given the highest priority. When suddenly the history, economics, languages and social relations of Africa are stepped-up by a political directive to the point where the work now being done on Africa compares with that done in South-East Asia, it is clear that this is for operational reasons rather than an academic love of science. Perhaps the most

SECRET

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Copy No. **108**

COMMUNISM AND AFRICA

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (Paris)

(No. 307. Secret)

Foreign Office,

Sir,

April 21, 1956.

I am becoming increasingly concerned about the mounting evidence that the Soviet Union, and the international machinery of Communism, has recently been giving considerably higher priority than before to African affairs.

2. The Soviet Union has now been active in the field of international subversion for so long that it is possible to look back and see fairly clearly how the rulers of that country set about preparing for an offensive against a specific area. The research carried out by Her Majesty's Government and other friendly Governments and, in addition, academic research in leading universities reinforced by the accounts received from prominent ex-Communists all establish a definite pattern which, given the great differences between the areas concerned, is surprisingly constant. Within the Foreign Office the various departments which deal with Russian and Communist affairs from different angles have all observed that the familiar pattern is now building up with regard to Africa and particularly Africa South of the Sahara.

3. Now that both the West Indies and Malaya are well on the way to self-government there is very little of the real colonial world left outside Africa, and when the Russians write about colonialism African illustrations are used more and more. It is fairly clear that the striking increase in Soviet propaganda "against colonialism" at a time when this phenomenon has virtually disappeared except in Africa is itself an indication of Communist intentions. The increase in this propaganda is one of the classic trends of evidence for any major subversive undertaking. In this context I am not merely thinking of the statements made by Khrushchev at the last Party Congress that it was now part of Soviet foreign policy to see the last vestiges of the colonial system eliminated (though the significance of this statement should not be overlooked).

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striking feature of this greatly increased output is how competent and well-informed it is in matters concerning languages, economic problems, sociology and the like, as contrasted with the totally inaccurate description of political conditions and the motives of the "exploiters." In this connection I would call your attention particularly to the Institute for the study of contemporary capitalism at the Academy of Science in Moscow, which has recently been exhorted to step up its work on the history and the study of economics as well as the language and literature of South and Central Africa. Colonial affairs have also now been given high priority in the programme of the recently established Institute for the Study of Contemporary Imperialism. In other words, it is not the generally tendentious anti-colonial and anti-Western broadcast and propaganda campaign, based on familiar and dreary Marxist theories, which gives grounds for alarm, it is the thoroughness of the spadework and preparation for future action and the systematic making ready of the international and other subversive organisations to carry out this action, which is such a disturbing repetition of similar preparations directed at other areas in the past.

6. While there is thus ample evidence that preparations are now being made by the Communist world for a phase of much more active trouble-making both in Colonial and independent Africa, overt manifestations of activity directly attributable to Communist organisations in the target area still remain scanty. But past experience has shown that the effectiveness of this campaign is partly due to the fact that they can operate for a long time underneath the surface a sponsoring and fanning of a wide range of local difficulties and discontent, mainly quite unconnected with the tenets of Communist doctrine or the ultimate strategic purposes of Moscow. I enclose a short list of official statements about tactics laid down through the years by Soviet authorities. It makes clear that the first task of Communist Parties and organisations in under-developed and Colonial countries is to form a common bond with all classes and parties willing to fight against "Colonial oppression"—which in practice means any connection with the Western democracies and their associates. The ideological struggle against the local bourgeoisie is to be launched only later, when independence has been achieved; but this does not mean that ideological training of "advanced workers" should not begin while operations are proceeding under cover. Reports from British Commonwealth territories confirm this. Considering the extent of the preparations now being made by the Communist world, and the fact that these preparations, though recently much increased are by no means new, singularly few overt manifestations of Communist activity have been observed in British territory in Africa. In other words, the shots are visibly being fired; but it is very difficult to see where they land or what effects they have in the target area.

7. I should like you to take a suitable opportunity to discuss this problem with the Government to which you are accredited. Your Excellency may wish to communicate to them, in suitable form, the enclosures to this despatch and to speak in its general sense. You should, in particular, stress the dangers of supposing that Communist activity is not widespread or well organised in an under-developed territory simply because local administrators, who have not received specialised training in detecting it, have seen few overt signs of its existence. I shall be interested to learn any comments which the Government to which you are accredited may feel able to make, and any suggestions which they may care to advance about ways and means of combating this threat, which is likely to be increasingly serious in the future.

8. I have addressed similar despatches to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Brussels (No. 125) and Lisbon (No. 71) and have sent a copy to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington who should discuss it with the appropriate organs of the United States Government. I have also sent copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow, Bonn, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Khartoum, Monrovia, Rome and Tripoli; to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Benghazi, Dakar, Leopoldville, Lourenco Marques and Tananarive; and to Her Majesty's Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

(Translation)

Enclosure 1

The W.F.T.U. is to intensify its "anti-colonial" campaign and to do everything possible to stir up trouble for colonial administrations.

Propaganda should be directed particularly against "imperialist repression" (e.g. in Cyprus) and the system of "exploitation" under which the wealth produced by workers and peasants in colonial territories goes into the pockets of monopolies and idle shareholders.

The W.F.T.U. should agitate for better working conditions, social welfare, &c., in colonies and should fight any attempt to prevent the workers from organising. They should also fight against racial discrimination.

Independence for colonial peoples is to be used as an international rallying cry for workers and a means of uniting them. Contacts between Asian and African workers are to be developed. Workers must close their ranks and act together to defend their class interests and to promote independence in colonial territories (i.e. the United Front tactic is to be used in this sphere).

Enclosure 2

Communist Tactics for the National Liberation Struggle in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries

"Hence, the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in capitalistically developed colonial and dependent countries are as follows:—

1. To win over the best elements of the working class to the side of Communism and to form independent Communist Parties.
2. To set up a national revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, and the revolutionary intelligentsia against the bloc of the compromising national bourgeoisie and imperialism.
3. To ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in this bloc.
4. To strive to emancipate the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie from the influence of the compromising national bourgeoisie.
5. To achieve a bond between the liberation movement and the proletarian movement in the advanced countries. . . ."

" . . . The second deviation consists in overrating the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movement and in underrating the importance of an alliance between the working class and the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. The Communists in Java, who recently erroneously put forward the slogan of a Soviet Government for their country, suffer, it seems, from this deviation. This is a deviation to the Left, which threatens to isolate the Communist Party from the masses and to transform it into a sect. A determined struggle against this deviation is an essential condition for the training of really revolutionary cadres for the colonies and dependent countries of the East. . . ." (Excerpt from speech delivered by Stalin to the students of the University of the Peoples of the East, May 18, 1925.)

"The toiling masses of the colonies struggling against imperialist slavery, represent a most powerful auxiliary force of the Socialist world revolution. The alliance with the USSR and with the revolutionary proletariat of the imperialist countries, creates for the toiling masses of the people of China, India and all other colonial and semi-colonial countries the possibility of an independent, free economic and cultural development, avoiding the stage of the domination of the capitalist system or even the development of capitalist relations in general. . . . In this struggle, the co-operation of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world and of the toiling masses of the colonies represents the surest guarantee of victory over imperialism. In this struggle, every conflict between two imperialist States as also war of the imperialists against the USSR, must be utilised in the colonies for the mobilisation of the masses and for drawing them into a decisive struggle against imperialism, for national emancipation, and for the victory of the workers and peasants."

Theses and Resolutions of VIth Congress of Communist International, 1928.
 "Theses on Revolutionary Movement in Colonies." International Press Correspondence. December 12, 1928. Volume 8, No. 88, page 1661.

"The task is to consolidate the advanced elements of the workers in colonial countries into a united Communist Party capable of taking a lead in the growing revolution. This is what Lenin said about the growing revolutionary movement in colonial countries as early as 1922: '... in these lands, 1905 is fast approaching, inexorably and with ever-increasing speed, but with this essential and enormous difference—that in 1905 the revolution in Russia could (at the outset at any rate) proceed in isolation, that is to say, without immediately drawing other countries into the revolution; whereas the revolutions growing in India and China are already being drawn, and have been drawn, into the revolutionary struggle, into the international revolution.'" (Volume 27, page 293) Stalin. "Report to XIVth Congress of C.P.S.U." 1925. Sochineniya. Moscow 1947. Volume 7, pages 108-9.

"In these conditions the task of the Indian Communists, drawing on the experience of the national liberation movement in China and other countries, is naturally to strengthen the alliance of the working class with all the peasantry, to fight for the introduction of urgently needed agrarian reform and—on the basis of common struggle for freedom and national independence of their country, against the Anglo-American imperialists oppressing it and against the reactionary big bourgeoisie and feudal princes collaborating with them—to unite all classes, parties, groups and organisations willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India." (Excerpt from article in the Cominform Journal of January 27, 1950, entitled "Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries.")

A "Statement of Policy" issued by the Indian Communist Party in November 1951 said that the party should desist from irrelevant arguments as to what the exact pattern of its future development should be but should concentrate on practical tasks.

"All these tasks call for the most intense, patient and daily work among the masses, continuous agitation on our basic programme and the immediate simple demands of every section of the people according to general and local conditions, practical leadership of mass struggles, a combination of various forms of struggles, and a systematic building up of a network of mass organisations."

"The Malayan Communist Party again declares that it is willing to strive for the independence, democracy and peace of Malaya, together with all nationalities, classes, and strata, and all political parties." (Statement of policy by the Malayan Communist Party, January 1956.)

"The teachings of Marx and Lenin and the experience of national wars in recent years, indicate the following tasks and tactics for the proletariat in wars of national liberation:—

- (a) The support the proletariat renders in these wars and the temporary alliance which—in certain cases—it enters into with the bourgeoisie, must under no circumstances imply the abandonment of the class war. Even when the bourgeoisie, for a time, fights side by side with the proletariat against the imperialists, it still remains the enemy and strives to utilise the proletariat for its own aims.
- (b) Therefore, the proletariat must not simply accept the policies and slogans of the bourgeoisie, but must act independently, advance its own political programme and slogans and set up its own revolutionary organisations (party, trade unions, workers' militia, proletarian military movements). The Communists must prepare the masses for the inevitable treachery of the bourgeoisie, take the strongest measures to retain the proletarian positions, do everything possible to hinder the bourgeoisie in its efforts to achieve its own class aims and to prepare for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

(c) In national wars in which the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeois government, plays a counter-revolutionary role (as is the case in the struggle which the Chinese workers and peasants are now carrying on to prevent the imperialists' dismemberment of China), the Communists must work for the overthrow of the bourgeois government under the slogan of national defence." (Theses and Resolutions of the VIth World Congress of the Comintern. November 1928.)

"The National Liberation struggle since the Second World War is developing at a time when the working class of the colonial and dependent countries is becoming more and more the leader of the national-liberation struggle. It is developing in conditions of the increasing consolidation of a single anti-imperialist front in these countries embracing the working class, the peasantry, the petty town-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The experience of the triumphant struggle of the Chinese people has shown the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries what huge latent possibilities there are in a united anti-imperialist front led by the working class and its vanguard. With the support of a united anti-imperialist front, the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries are raising ever higher the banner of the struggle for national independence, democracy and peace." (From the periodical "Oriental Studies in the Soviet Union," No. 4, 1955.)

ISD 127/145/01

28th April, 1956.

TOP SECRET

As there was not time at the last meeting of the Committee on Counter-Subversion in Colonial Territories to take GHN.520/3, it may be useful if I set down in writing our feeling about the points touching the Colonies in Dean's letter of the 12th of April.

First, we are of the opinion that it would be wrong to go back to the system of regularly reporting on communism, in the form of monthly notes on current manifestations, as was done in the case of the A.C.(O) Committee. It was precisely this practice, forced on it by its terms of reference, that in our view largely stultified the work of the A.C.(O) Committee. It is not in practice useful to seek to study and deal with Communist manifestations in isolation; and it is necessary to look at the situation of each territory or region as a whole, and to avoid the fallacy of regarding communism as our only problem. To do that continuously for each Colony would be an overwhelming task for a Committee, and indeed it constitutes a large part of the work of the Colonial Office itself. In our view the most useful course of action for the Committee is precisely that which it has so far followed, namely to select specific territories for studies designed in the first place to enable a view to be formed whether there is a clandestine job to be done there or not. For the purpose of selecting territories for such studies, we shall produce a general review of the security situation in the Colonies, and this it would be fairly simple to revise and bring up to date at say six monthly intervals. We could also undertake to bring at once to the Committee's notice any important new development. In addition, the Committee would I am sure find it useful to refer to the relevant sections of the J.I.C. survey of world communism, the latest edition of which should be finalised very soon. It would be a pity in our view if the Committee were to be

/diverted

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR NORMAN BROOK, G.C.B.

diverted from its basic planning and policy task into too much discussion of small "spot" problems as a matter of regular routine.

As regards Dean's second paragraph we entirely agree that Colonial Governments should be warned of any new Communist strategy, and to that end we have repeatedly asked over the past few months for an authoritative statement of just what that new strategy is and what new kind of subversive or other attentions Colonial Governments should look out for as a result of it. So far, such a statement has not been forthcoming either from the Foreign Office or from the J.I.C. I have seen the despatch to Foreign Office posts (dated the 21st of April) to which I think Dean refers in his letter, but if I may say so that despatch assumes the existence of a new drive rather than demonstrates and describes it.

(37)
on 15/10 6/1/57. It would certainly be unfortunate if the Gold Coast Government invited a Russian representative to their independence celebrations, and we should hope to prevent them from doing so by persuasion which the Governor is well placed to exert.

(C.Y. Carstairs.)



COLONIAL OFFICE,
THE CHURCH HOUSE,
GREAT SMITH STREET, S.W.1.

ISD.127/145/01

27th April, 1956.

TOP SECRET

L. M. Lawrence

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on (22.4.56)

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/As

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(16 lines)
~~Certainly~~ As to the Gold Coast independence celebrations, we would agree that ~~It would be unfortunate if the Gold Coast Government invited a Russian representative, but it is not clear what action we could take to prevent them from doing so, except by persuasion,~~ *and the Governor is well placed to expect.* *and we should hope*

